Article XII-1
On leaving the protection market
Security is not a commodity: fundamental protection cannot be bought.
Security is not a commodity. It is a right of every being (see Article III-6).
The aims to put an end to the protection market, in which security is bought at the price of money, resources or submission.
Fundamental protection is guaranteed regardless of the resources of the one who needs it. No private payment may buy a priority contrary to the public criteria of necessity. Supplementary services remain possible, under the rules of Articles XII-3 and XII-4: being paid for a service is not enough to make it a racket.
Statement of reasons
The protection market is one of the most powerful engines of the loop. It works like this: the plunderers threaten; the weakest look for a protector; the protector sets its price; those who cannot pay remain unprotected, and some of them, to survive, become plunderers in turn. The threat feeds the demand for protection, and paid protection feeds the threat. It is a machine that itself produces what it claims to fight.
The charter draws from this five reasons to leave it.
First reason: the protection market manufactures plunderers. Those who cannot buy their security have only two choices: to suffer, or to join those who threaten. The more expensive protection is, the more plunder recruits (see the iteration of the two tariffs, Article III-6).
Second reason: it leads to vassalage. When the price of protection becomes submission, the protected lose their freedom (see the iteration of the rampart, Article I-1). The protection market is the economic form of vassalage.
Third reason: it has no interest in peace. Whoever sells security lives off insecurity. If the threat disappeared, its market would disappear with it. It therefore has an interest, deep down, in the threat never disappearing.
Fourth reason: it changes sides. Purchased protection belongs to whoever pays most. The day someone else pays more, the protector becomes the threat.
Fifth reason: it leads to extinction. In a universe where the war of all against all is permanent, a security reserved for those who can pay leaves the others at the mercy of the plunderers. Entire communities disappear, for having been unable to buy their survival (see Article VII-4).
Case law of the loopThe Iteration of the Faithful Protector
A planet had for centuries paid a protection company. The company was effective: the plunderers never came near. The planet paid dearly, but it was at peace.
One day, the planet sought to cut its spending. The company let it know, politely, that the plunderers seemed more numerous this year. A few incidents occurred, which it settled quickly. The planet understood and paid. It never knew whether the plunderers had really been more numerous, or whether the company had simply reminded it that it knew where they were. That is the secret of the protection market: one never knows whether one pays to be protected, or not to be attacked by one’s protector.
Objection and replyVote before reading the reply
Objection. The protection market at least has the merit of existing. Without it, the weakest would be defenseless.
What would you have answered? Your position, before reading the reply:
Your position: . Here is the charter’s reply.
Reply. That is why the charter does not abolish it at a stroke: it replaces it with a common force (see Article XII-2), and regulates mercenary activity during the transition (see Article XII-9). But it refuses to make it a permanent state. A protection that depends on the ability to pay is not a protection: it is a privilege, and it is a threat.
Earthly example
Human history knows many forms of protection racket, from criminal organizations that “protect” the businesses they threaten to warlords who tax the populations they claim to defend. The safest human societies are generally those where security is provided by a public force, funded by all and accessible to all.