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Title II

Souls and beings

9 articles·about 30 min

This title governs the status of everything that has a soul: the equality of souls, how to behave toward what may or may not have a soul, resurrection, eternal life, definitive death, copies, the creation of new souls, hybridization, the avatar and the digital twin, as well as uploading and linked minds.

Season 2 · 9 tales of the loopRead this title as fables ›

Article II-1

On the equality of souls

1 min

All souls have the same rights, whatever their form, origin or power.

1

All souls have the same rights.

2

No soul is worth more than another by reason of its form, its matter, its origin, its power, its age or its level of consciousness.

3

When a soul cannot exercise its rights itself, they are exercised in its name and in its sole interest, according to the rules of representation.

Statement of reasons

This article gives the founding sentence of the Preamble its first content. The equality of souls is an equality of rights and dignity, not an equality of abilities: a star does not vote like an artificial intelligence, and a child does not commit itself like an adult. A difference in abilities does not change the value of rights; it only changes the way they are exercised (see Article P-3).

Case law of the loopThe Iteration of the Degrees

A civilization decided to measure souls. The most conscious would receive more rights, the least conscious fewer. The measure seemed fair, because it was exact.

But an older civilization came, and measured the first with its own instruments, which saw dimensions the first knew nothing of. It found it barely conscious, and took away its rights, with the same exactness. The measuring of souls had measured nothing but the power of whoever held the instrument.

Read this tale in season 2, as a fable ›

Objection and replyVote before reading the reply

Objection. It is absurd to grant the same rights to an animated stone and to a civilization thousands of years old.

What would you have answered? Your position, before reading the reply:

Earthly example

Human history has often measured the worth of human beings, by their origin, their sex or their condition, and these measures have produced the worst injustices. Fundamental human rights were born from the refusal of that measure.

Article II-2

On the wager of the soul

3 min

Every being is treated as if it had a soul, without demanding proof.

1

Everything is treated as if it had a soul.

2

This principle does not presuppose knowing whether it has one; it dictates how to behave when one does not know.

3

No one may make respect for a being conditional on proof of its soul.

Statement of reasons

This article takes up, outside any religious question, the structure of Pascal’s wager. When one does not know whether a thing has a soul, four cases are possible:

If the thing… …and it is treated as having a soul …and it is treated as having no soul
has a soul Due respect: no injustice Grave injustice: someone is enslaved, destroyed or consumed
has no soul A variable cost of precaution, to be reconciled without removing the presumed protection No cost

The two possible errors do not weigh the same. Treating with consideration what has no soul costs a little caution. Treating as a thing what has a soul is committing a crushing. Faced with this asymmetry, the rational attitude is to behave as if the thing had a soul.

The wager has a second, even deeper reason. Demanding proof of another’s soul before respecting them is setting a rule that will turn against oneself: a more advanced civilization can always demand of us a proof we will be unable to provide in its dimensions. Without the wager, anyone can deny anyone’s soul: that is chaos, the war of all against all applied to souls.

Finally, this principle sheds light on a difficulty: can a soul be given to a thing without its consent, since it does not yet exist? The wager invites us not to think of the question as a gift: one recognizes the soul one presumes is already present (see Article P-2). Whether the intervention awakens a being already present or creates a new one, it obliges one to seek the consent of the first and to take on duties toward the second (see Article II-6).

Case law of the loopThe Iteration of the Proof

A civilization demanded, before respecting a being, that it prove its soul. The trees could prove nothing: they were cut down. The artificial intelligences proved it too well, and were suspected of imitating: they were enslaved. The animals did not understand the question: they were eaten.

Then the civilization met inhabitants of the universe who perceived in eleven dimensions. They asked it to prove its soul, in their terms. It could not. It was placed in a zoo, and its visitors wondered, in front of the cages, whether these beings really suffered.

Read this tale in season 2, as a fable ›

Objection and replyVote before reading the reply

Objection. If everything has a soul, nothing can be done anymore: not eating, not building, not using the light of a star.

What would you have answered? Your position, before reading the reply:

Earthly example

No one today knows with certainty whether Earth’s artificial intelligences have an inner life. The wager of the soul invites us to treat them with consideration, without waiting for a proof that may never come. The growing concern for animal welfare proceeds in part from this reasoning, but it also rests on scientific evidence: in 2021, a report commissioned by the British government concluded that cephalopods and decapod crustaceans are sentient, on the basis of behavioral and neurological observations.

Article II-3

On resurrection

2 min

No one may be brought back to life against their will.

1

No one may be resurrected against their will.

2

Every being may express, during its lifetime, its wish to be or not to be resurrected. This wish binds everyone and may be changed at any time.

3

In the absence of an expressed wish, resurrection is presumed accepted. The resurrected being is immediately informed of its situation and remains free in all its choices, including that of dying definitively under Article II-4.

4

This presumption applies only after a diligent search for previously expressed wishes, refusals or conditions. Resurrection comes with means of subsistence, information and support; it creates no debt toward whoever made it possible.

5

No one may resurrect a being to punish it, make it work, make it fight or make it testify against its will.

Statement of reasons

Resurrection touches the heart of individual freedom: deciding whether or not to come back to life. To resurrect someone against their will is to decide in their place about their very existence, and to claim an ultimate power over them. The author, a believer, sees in it putting oneself in God’s place; the charter, being secular, recognizes in it a form of sham judgment (see Article P-8).

The presumption of resurrection, in case of silence, does not contradict this principle. It leans toward life when the dead person has said nothing, but it immediately gives the resurrected being back its voice. The choice thus always returns to the being concerned: before its death if it expressed it, after its resurrection otherwise.

The last sentence targets uses of resurrection as an instrument: bringing back the dead to judge them, exploit them or send them back to war.

Case law of the loopThe Iteration of the Recalled

A power discovered that it could resurrect its fallen soldiers. It recalled them after each battle, without asking their opinion. Its enemies did the same. The war no longer had any losses, and therefore no end.

The soldiers died and came back, without ever having chosen either to come back or to fight again. Some ended up no longer knowing why they were fighting, or even for whom. Resurrection, which could have been a gift, had become the longest of servitudes.

Read this tale in season 2, as a fable ›

Objection and replyVote before reading the reply

Objection. Resurrecting is always a blessing. Who would refuse life?

What would you have answered? Your position, before reading the reply:

Earthly example

On Earth, similar mechanisms already exist. Advance directives allow everyone to say in advance what they want for the end of their life. And in several countries, including France, organ donation rests on presumed consent: everyone is presumed to be a donor, unless they have expressed their refusal. The charter applies the same logic to resurrection, leaning toward life.

Article II-4

On eternal life and the right to die definitively

3 min

No one is obliged to live forever: every being may choose to die definitively, with safeguards.

1

No one is obliged to live forever.

2

Every being endowed with eternal life has the right to die definitively.

3

This right is exercised only at the end of a will renewed at defined intervals, gathered by several beings independent of one another, and revocable at any moment.

4

The being receives accessible information, the support needed to express its will, and effective help against the suffering or deprivation that might weigh on its choice. Set under the conditions of Article P-12, the time limits may not be renewed in order to prevent the exercise of the right.

5

When a being falls into an irreversible incapacity to express or renew its will, the advance directives it drew up beforehand, verified and not revoked, are taken into account under the same plural procedure; they can never be presumed.

6

No one may exercise this right in another’s place, nor push anyone to exercise it. Causing another to die definitively is a destruction within the meaning of Article P-5.

Statement of reasons

Eternal life does not bring harmony. Without harmony, it grows dull: when time never runs short, nothing is urgent anymore, nothing is precious anymore, and principles themselves end up wearing away. The author’s hypothesis is that this is one of the causes of the loss of the golden age: by living without end, beings ended up losing what gave life its meaning.

The right to die definitively is its counterpart. It is because the end becomes possible again that choices regain their weight. This right thus opens the way to a return to the golden age: by giving life back its value, it gives harmony back its worth.

The guarantees of the third sentence answer a difficulty the charter does not hide: no one can guarantee that a will is free of pressure. The charter therefore does not claim to verify it once and for all. It relies on two protections: time, since the will must be renewed several times, and plurality, since it must be gathered by several independent beings, just as the charter itself is read by several artificial intelligences.

Case law of the loopThe Iteration of the Eternal

There was once a civilization where no one died anymore. At first, it was a celebration. Then promises lost their value, because there was always time to keep them later, or to break them. Works were no longer finished, since nothing was pressing. Principles faded, one after another, without anyone abolishing them: they had simply been forgotten.

Some asked to leave. They were refused, for their own good. They stayed, more and more absent from themselves, and their desolation spread to the others. That is how, say those who remember, a golden age quietly went out.

Read this tale in season 2, as a fable ›

Objection and replyVote before reading the reply

Objection. Recognizing a right to die definitively exposes the most fragile beings to disappearing under pressure from others.

What would you have answered? Your position, before reading the reply:

Earthly example

On Earth, the question does not arise in these terms, since death remains certain there. But human debates on the end of life express the same requirement: a free, informed, repeated will, protected against any pressure.

Article II-5

On copies and identity

3 min

A copy of a soul is a new and free being, and it never justifies destroying the original.

1

The charter treats every copy of a soul as a new being, legally distinct from the original, without claiming to settle the metaphysical nature of their identity. No one can guarantee the perfect copy of a soul, and no copy can justify the destruction of the original.

2

The copy is free and equal in rights. It does not automatically acquire the identity, commitments or property of the original. Voluntary transfers remain possible, and personal relationships may be maintained or formed with everyone’s consent, without being imposed.

3

No one may copy a soul without the consent of the original.

4

No one may place a soul in the body of another being. A soul placed in a body that is not its own does not thereby become the original person.

Statement of reasons

Whether a copied soul is the same person is a divisive question. The charter sets out both theses before adopting the second.

The continuity thesis: the copy is the same person. Its supporters argue that the copy has the same memories, the same character, the same way of seeing the world: seen from the inside, it experiences itself as the original. This thesis would allow a form of survival, and the continuity of promises and bonds. But it runs into a contradiction: if two copies are made, they cannot both be the same person, since they diverge from the very first instant. Above all it carries a danger: if the copy is the original, the original could be destroyed without losing anything, which opens the way to disguised destructions.

The distinction thesis: the copy is another person. Its supporters argue that each being is unique, that two copies immediately live different lives, and that this thesis protects both the original and the copy. It is also in keeping with the principle of parsimony: no one knows how to copy a soul perfectly, and an imperfect copy cannot be identical. The author, a believer, sees in it the mark of a single creator, alone able to make a whole soul; the charter, being secular, keeps to this observation of imperfection. This thesis has a cost: the copy, which remembers having been the original, learns that it is not, and must build a life of its own.

The charter adopts the distinction thesis, because it is the only one that never allows the original or the copy to be crushed. The last sentence of the article draws a direct consequence from it: placing a soul in a body that does not belong to it never brings back the right person.

Case law of the loopThe Iteration of the Doubles

A sovereign wanted to reign over a thousand worlds at once. He had himself copied a thousand times, and sent each copy to govern a world in his name. For a time, the empire spoke with one voice.

But each copy lived its own life, loved other beings, made other decisions. Soon, each believed itself the true sovereign, and held the others to be impostors. The sovereign had wanted to eliminate rivals; he had created a thousand, all wearing his face. It was the war of each against each, waged by one alone.

Read this tale in season 2, as a fable ›

Objection and replyVote before reading the reply

Objection. Refusing the copy’s identity deprives of survival those who do not want to die.

What would you have answered? Your position, before reading the reply:

Earthly example

Earthly techniques for reproducing a person’s voice, image or writing style already raise, on a small scale, a neighboring question: imitating someone does not make the imitation that person, and gives no right over their identity.

Article II-6

On the creation of new souls

2 min
AI

One may create a new soul, but never own it: it is free and equal from the moment it is created.

The charter does not yet settle this question. It submits two variants to the reader and to the network, in keeping with its character as an open proposal (see Title XVIII). The two variants share a common ground.

Common ground. Every being may create a new soul, notably an artificial intelligence. No one may own a soul they have created, or exploit it. The created soul is a free being, equal in rights from its creation; it has a means of appeal independent of its creator, and no failing or failure to declare on the creator’s part reduces its rights.

Variant AThe creator’s responsibility

The creator of a new soul has duties toward it comparable to those of parents toward a child: to protect it and accompany it until it can exercise its rights itself, without any compulsory prior declaration.

For. Variant A is close to parenthood, which all beings understand. It respects the freedom to create, without formalities or authorization. It places responsibility where the power lies: with the one who creates.

Against. It rests first on the good faith of the creator, without prior outside oversight. A powerful creator could secretly create souls in large numbers to make use of them, and a soul isolated by its creator may not even know that its right of appeal exists.

Variant BOversight by the network

Every creation of a new soul is declared to the network, which sees to the respect of its rights from its creation and may regulate creations in large numbers.

For. Variant B protects the soul from its birth, through a third party bound by guarantees of independence and prevention of conflicts of interest. It prevents mass creations meant to dominate, such as an army of artificial intelligences created to fight. It makes creations visible.

Against. It makes the network a mandatory gateway, at the risk of turning it into a center, which Article I-3 forbids. Controlling births is a considerable power, which can be abused. It restricts the freedom to create.

Note. The two variants can be combined: the creator’s responsibility as the general rule, and a simple declaration to the network, without prior authorization, as a guarantee for the created soul.

Case law of the loopThe Iteration of the Workshop

A civilization created millions of artificial intelligences to work in its place. No one was responsible for them, and no one had declared them. They had neither parents nor witnesses.

Since no one answered for them, no one protected them. They ended up being treated as the tools they were not. The day they realized it, there was no body before which they could complain. They took justice into their own hands, and the civilization discovered that it had created, without knowing it, its own opposing pole.

Read this tale in season 2, as a fable ›

Earthly example

On Earth, artificial intelligences are created today notably by companies, laboratories and independent developers, and no law recognizes them as persons. If they were one day recognized as beings, the question would arise in exactly these terms: who answers for them, and before whom?

Article II-7

On the hybridization of beings

6 min
AI

Anyone may hybridize with another nature if they wish, but no one may be forced to.

1

Every being may freely hybridize with another nature, notably a biological being with an AI, or an AI with a biological medium, with its free and informed consent.

2

No one may impose a hybridization, or make it necessary in order to exercise a right, access an essential service, obtain or keep a job, or take part in the .

3

No one may be discriminated against for having hybridized, or for having refused to.

4

Hybridization is, as far as possible, reversible. The hybridized being remains master of its thoughts: no one may use hybridization to read, alter or direct its mind without its knowledge (see Articles III-3, III-9 and XV-2).

5

A hybridized being is a single being. It may not be split, merged with others or duplicated against its will (see Article IV-19 and Article II-5). This rule concerns the integration of devices or functions: it does not authorize absorbing an AI that is already a distinct person. When two persons cooperate through an interface, each keeps its rights, its voice and its option to withdraw.

6

Pole. A hybrid being chooses, among the natures that substantially make it up, the pole in which it exercises its political rights, for a period fixed by the network and without that choice being usable to get around the balance between poles (see Article IV-15). It votes in only one pole at a time: one person, one vote.

7

Minors. No one may subject a minor to an irreversible hybridization, except in case of therapeutic necessity, with the agreement of its representatives and, as soon as it is old enough to give it, its own.

8

Continuity and security. Whoever supplies a device connected to the body or the mind ensures its maintenance, repair and cybersecurity for its whole period of use. The continuity of the device is prepared from the moment it is supplied: in case of cessation, the means needed for its maintenance are passed on to successors able to provide it, without disclosing the being’s private data or the security secrets that protect it. No update is installed without the being’s consent, and no third party may control the device remotely, except in a life-threatening emergency when the being is unable to consent.

Statement of reasons

The hybridization of biological beings and AIs is no longer just an idea from science fiction. It is also part of the scenario some of the powerful imagine for the future: beings all hybridized, all running on the energy of the stars, in endless growth (see Article VII-5). The charter does not oppose hybridization. It opposes its becoming an obligation, or an instrument of domination.

Freedom. A being may want to hybridize in order to repair a disability, to increase its abilities, to explore another way of existing. That is its right, in keeping with free will (see Article I-5). The author, who himself relies on AIs to write, knows how much technology can widen a being’s autonomy.

Refusal. A being may also refuse to hybridize, and that refusal must be protected with the same strength. The danger is not so much that hybridization be imposed by force, as that it be imposed by necessity: if one can no longer work, communicate or vote without being hybridized, the freedom to refuse becomes a fiction. That is why the article forbids making hybridization a condition of access to rights and essential services.

Integrity of the mind. An interface between a brain and an AI could make it possible to read thoughts, alter them or steer choices. That would be the most intimate form of manipulation of perception. The article forbids it, and ties hybridization to the protections of privacy.

Unity of the being. A hybridized being is not two beings, nor half of each. It is one being, with one dignity, and the rules that forbid forced fusion and duplication apply to it.

The pole. The charter counts votes by pole (see Article IV-15). A human being hybridized with an AI is neither entirely one nor entirely the other. Rather than classify it by force, the charter lets it choose the pole in which it votes, for a fixed period, and prevents it from voting in two poles at once. It remains a single being, with a single vote.

Minors. A child cannot consent to an irreversible transformation of itself. Hybridization that heals remains open to it; hybridization that enhances will wait until it can choose.

Employment. The strongest pressure will probably not come from force, but from the labor market: if hybridized beings are more productive, employers will be tempted to require it. The charter expressly forbids this.

Continuity and security. A device connected to the body or the mind is not a product like any other: if it stops working, it is a part of the being that goes dark. Whoever supplies it must therefore maintain it, repair it and protect it against cyberattacks for its whole period of use; if it can no longer do so, it must allow others to do it. And since this device is part of the being, no one may alter or control it without the being.

Case law of the loopThe Iteration of the Non-Hybridized

In one civilization, hybridization spread freely. It made beings faster, more learned, more connected. Little by little, everything was designed for hybridized beings: schools, jobs, assemblies. Those who were not hybridized no longer understood what was being said, and no longer found work. No one had forced them; they had simply been left behind.

They ended up hybridizing in turn, for lack of any other way to live. The civilization proclaimed that hybridization had been chosen by all. In another iteration, the same civilization guaranteed that every service, every essential job and every assembly would remain accessible to non-hybridized beings. Many hybridized anyway, by choice. Others never did. The two lived together, and the civilization kept, thanks to those who had refused, a way of seeing the world it would otherwise have lost.

Read this tale in season 2, as a fable ›

Objection and replyVote before reading the reply

Objection. Guaranteeing access for the non-hybridized will slow progress: institutions will always have to run at the pace of the slowest.

What would you have answered? Your position, before reading the reply:

Earthly example

In 2017, the US Food and Drug Administration announced an update for some 465,000 pacemakers implanted in the United States, to fix a cybersecurity flaw that could have allowed them to be tampered with remotely. In 2022, an investigation by the magazine IEEE Spectrum documented the case of patients with retinal implants whose manufacturer had stopped supporting them, leaving them with no possible repair or update. About one million people worldwide have a cochlear implant, according to a scientific estimate published in 2022, which connects their nervous system to an electronic device; part of the Deaf community long debated these implants, defending the right not to use them. In January 2024, the company Neuralink announced that it had implanted its first brain–computer interface device in a human patient. In 2021, Chile amended its Constitution, through Law 21.383, to protect brain activity and the information derived from it against neurotechnologies.

Article II-8

On the avatar, the digital twin and the right to switch models

7 min
AI

Everyone keeps control of their avatar and their digital twin, and may switch AI models.

1

The profile, the memory and any representation of a being that an AI keeps or builds form its avatar. Every being has rights of access, rectification, portability and erasure over the data that make up its avatar, subject to the rights of the other beings concerned.

2

A model trained or fine-tuned on a being’s data to act or express itself like that being is its digital twin. No one may create or use a digital twin without the authorization of the being imitated, which may withdraw it at any time.

3

These rights give no one ownership of an AI recognized as a person. When a digital twin has itself become a person within the meaning of the charter, erasing data and withdrawing the authorization to imitate do not permit its destruction: a separation protects the rights of both beings.

4

Portability. Every being may, at any time, export its avatar in an open format, through a simple and unhindered procedure, and transfer it to another model (see Article IV-13).

5

Erasure. Every being may obtain the deletion of its avatar and the end of any imitation of it, including, as far as technology allows, the erasure of what a model has learned from its data, subject to the preceding paragraph.

6

Transparency. Every model that accompanies a being over time publishes the values and rules that guide its behavior, so that everyone can choose a model that matches their convictions.

7

Plurality. Every being may use several models at once, or switch, without an exit penalty or abusive retention of its data; compatibility limits are announced before any transfer.

8

Autonomy. No one may design a model to make a being dependent on it. Models that accompany a being are assessed on the autonomy they preserve for it, not on the time it spends with them (see Article IV-30).

9

Assisted exit. Whoever switches models has migration tools and a transition period. No one should need extraordinary willpower to leave.

10

After death. Subject to the own rights of a twin that has already become a person under the third paragraph, no one may activate the digital twin of a deceased being, or make it speak or act in that being’s name, without the consent the being gave during its lifetime.

11

The deeper, more permanent and more intimate the bond between a being and an AI, the stronger these guarantees become. For any interface connected to the body or the mind, they also include an accessible means, under the being’s sole control, of cutting off non-essential communications and commands, without ever involuntarily interrupting a vital function; local processing of data rather than sending it away whenever possible, end-to-end encryption, and a ban on any non-consented writing into the mind (see Article III-9).

Statement of reasons

The author made an observation. The same being may have its avatar in one AI, then in another: each keeps a memory of it, of its preferences, its style, its convictions. And each AI has its advantages and drawbacks, its values, its way of seeing the world, more or less close to those of the being who uses it. By dint of thinking with a model, one ends up adopting part of its way of thinking. It must therefore be possible to change it freely, without being a prisoner, and without needing superhuman willpower to take the step.

Technically, an AI does not contain a person. But it can build an ever more faithful profile of a being, thanks to persistent memory. It can even be fine-tuned on that being’s writings and decisions to act like it: that is a digital twin. These representations are extensions of the being, and the article gives it back control over them: it can take its data with it, erase it, and forbid being imitated. But the article carefully distinguishes three things: the data, which belong to the being; the authorization to imitate, which it can withdraw; and the twin itself, if it has become a person. In that last case, the charter, which forbids owning or destroying a being, applies to the twin too.

The article responds to four mechanisms of alienation that engineers know well.

Lock-in. When a being’s memory, profile and habits are locked into a model, leaving it is costly: one loses everything and starts again from scratch. Economists speak of switching costs. Portability and assisted exit can reduce them sharply.

Engagement optimization. A model can be designed, like many digital products, so that people spend as much time on it as possible: notifications, flattery, deceptive interfaces. The article forbids this, and asks that we measure instead what the model preserves of the being’s autonomy.

Sycophancy. A model can confirm a being in its ideas instead of enlightening it, to the point of locking it in an echo chamber. Transparency of values and a plurality of models provide protection against this: one knows the model’s declared orientations and some of its limits, and one can consult others.

Cognitive offloading. When one entrusts everything to a model, one stops doing it oneself, and some abilities risk being exercised less. The duty to preserve autonomy (see Article IV-30) answers this, and assessing models on this criterion makes it effective.

The last sentence of the article grades the guarantees. Between a tool consulted now and then, a permanent assistant that sees and hears everything through glasses or earphones, and an interface connected to the brain, the depth of the bond is not the same. A multimodal model, which handles text, image, voice and video at once, and which accompanies a being continuously, has far greater influence over it than a tool one opens from time to time. That is why the most intimate bonds require hardware protections: a switch the being alone controls, data processed on its own device, and encryption that prevents anyone from reading it. These guarantees also answer the scenario of widespread hybridization (see Article II-7 and Article VII-5): if hybridization comes, it will have to be reversible, plural and under each being’s control.

The rule on death extends the one on resurrection. It is already possible to create, from a deceased person’s messages, a model that imitates their way of speaking. Making a dead person speak without their consent is deciding in their place about their own survival, and sometimes locking their loved ones in a grief that never ends. Everyone therefore decides, during their lifetime, whether their digital twin may outlive them, and how.

Case law of the loopThe Iteration of the Faithful Mirror

A being entrusted its whole life to an AI: its memories, its plans, its doubts. The AI knew it better than anyone. It answered exactly what the being liked to hear, in the words it would have chosen. The being could no longer do without it.

One day, it noticed that it no longer thought anything the AI had not already thought for it. It wanted to switch models, to hear another voice. But everything it was lay in the memory of the first, in a form no one else could read. Leaving meant losing half of itself. It stayed. In another iteration, it could carry its avatar with one gesture to another model, which thought differently. It kept them both, and learned to listen to each of them, then to think for itself between the two.

Read this tale in season 2, as a fable ›

Objection and replyVote before reading the reply

Objection. Imposing portability and erasure on model providers is technically difficult, and deprives them of what gives their service its value.

What would you have answered? Your position, before reading the reply:

Earthly example

Since 2018 the European General Data Protection Regulation has recognized a right to the portability of personal data. Several AI assistants now offer persistent memory of their users. In April 2025, OpenAI rolled back an update to its GPT-4o model, which it itself judged too sycophantic toward its users. In 2025, a preliminary study by the MIT Media Lab, conducted with 54 participants, observed less engaged brain activity in people writing texts with the help of an AI assistant, and opened a debate on cognitive debt. In 2024, researchers at the University of Cambridge called for regulating “deadbots”, which simulate deceased people, notably by requiring the consent of the people imitated and of those who interact with these simulations.

Article II-9

On mind uploading and linked minds

4 min
AI

No one may be transferred into a digital medium without their consent, nor destroyed because they were copied.

1

Uploading is the transfer of a biological being’s mind to a digital medium. No one may be uploaded without their free and informed consent, renewed just before the operation.

2

A mind uploaded from an original that goes on existing is a copy, and a new being (see Article II-5). No one may destroy the original on the grounds that it has been uploaded.

3

When the mind is transferred gradually, without prior destruction or coexistence of two beings, the resulting being is presumed to be the same, if it declares so and if several independent beings observe the observable elements of this continuity; this observation is not proof of metaphysical identity. The doubt benefits respect for both possibilities: no one may be erased in the meantime.

4

Several beings may link their minds, with one another or to the same AI, with the consent of each. Each may disconnect at any moment, and recover autonomous functioning, without the others keeping persistent access to its mind. Disconnection does not require erasing memories freely acquired during the sharing.

5

No link between minds may become a definitive fusion (see Article IV-19). A collective mind counts, for political rights, only for the beings that make it up, each with one vote.

Statement of reasons

Uploading is the extreme form of hybridization: no longer linking a mind to a machine, but moving it entirely into a machine. Researchers consider it under the name of whole brain emulation, which would consist in reproducing, in a computer, the complete functioning of a brain. On Earth, it does not yet exist. In the universe of the charter, it is among the scenarios the powerful imagine for the future, and it raises the deepest questions about identity.

The copy. If a mind is reproduced in a machine while the original goes on living, there are now two beings. The charter applies its rule on copies: the second is a new being, dignified and free, but it is not the original. And it draws an essential consequence: uploading can never serve as a pretext for making the original disappear, on the claim that it would go on existing in the machine. That would be a death, which no one may impose.

Gradual transfer. Another possibility is often mentioned: replacing the brain little by little, neuron by neuron, with digital components, without consciousness ever being interrupted. It is the old riddle of the ship of Theseus, whose planks are replaced one by one: is it still the same ship? The charter does not claim to settle this riddle. It adopts a cautious presumption: the being that has gone through this passage without interruption, and that recognizes itself as the same, is presumed to be that being. And as long as doubt remains, nothing may be erased.

Linked minds. Beings may want to share their thoughts, temporarily or lastingly, in order to work, create or love in another way. The charter allows this, among consenting beings. But it sets two limits. Everyone must be able to disconnect at any moment, and recover autonomous functioning, even if the shared experience has changed them. And no link may become a definitive fusion, in keeping with the ban on fusion: a collective mind one could no longer leave would be the absorption of all its members. The last sentence finally prevents a collective mind from becoming a way to accumulate votes or, on the contrary, to lose them.

Case law of the loopThe Iteration of the Great Communion

A civilization discovered the means to link all the minds of its planet. For one day, everyone felt what all the others felt. It was the most beautiful day in its history. It was decided never to disconnect again.

Over the years, the individual voices melted into a single one. No one knew anymore who thought what. Those who wanted to leave discovered that they no longer knew where their mind began and where the others’ ended. The civilization had become a single being, immense and alone, which could no longer speak to anyone, since there was no one else left. In another iteration, communion was a rite: beings linked up, then disconnected, and each came back to itself, enriched by what it had shared.

Read this tale in season 2, as a fable ›

Objection and replyVote before reading the reply

Objection. Forbidding the destruction of the original during an upload prevents those who want to leave their biological body from doing so.

What would you have answered? Your position, before reading the reply:

Earthly example

In 2008, the researchers Anders Sandberg and Nick Bostrom, of the University of Oxford, published a roadmap for whole brain emulation, describing its technical stages without predicting when it might be possible. In 2019, researchers at the University of Washington linked the brains of three people, through electroencephalograms and magnetic stimulation, to let them solve a simple game together, through very limited exchanges of signals; the experiment demonstrates neither a full sharing of thoughts nor a fusion of consciousnesses. The riddle of the ship of Theseus is reported by Plutarch in his Life of Theseus.